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SECURITY INFORMATION

INTERIM NOTES ON THE PROBLEM OF
CANCELLATION

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INTERIM NOTES ON THE PROBLEM OF CANCELLATION

This is a report of work in progress which leads us to the following tentative policy recommendations:

1. The United States Intelligence collection and evaluation effort re CANCELLATION should be sharply focussed on four divisive potentials, (although others should not be excluded):
 - a. The personal relationships among the top leadership
 - b. The orientation of the Russian economy
 - c. The power balance between the "old" and the "new" in the Politburo, and
 - d. The political orientation of the Soviet military.
2. The U.S. should project its long-run aims vis-a-vis West Eurasia (emphasizing their consistency with the Russian national interest) in such a way as to minimize apprehensions of nationalists opposed to the regime that a bid for power on their part and a consequent internal struggle would result in foreign (i.e., Western) military intervention.



3. At the present time U.S. policy should avoid preparatory action re CANCELLATION other than along the above lines. It is our judgment that the greatest danger faced by the United States in this context is in taking action which will, by increasing the vested interest of the leadership in the stability of the system, neutralize such divisive potentials as may exist and hence defeat U.S. purposes. Political warfare based on

S-E-C-R-E-T

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imperfect information may serve simply to help maintain the solidarity of the leadership; and in general, therefore, elaborate action now, aimed to exploit the CANCELLATION situation, is judged premature.

S-E-C-R-E-T

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I. Aim of this Paper

1. The following paper is strictly interim in character, both with respect to the information it contains and the conclusions drawn. A more detailed paper on this theme will form a part of the Report on Soviet Vulnerability (target date, approximately 30 June, 1952). The purpose of this paper is to draw, from an appraisal of the setting of the problem, certain tentative conclusions for U.S. policy and action. These conclusions envisage action from the present forward designed to maximize the chances of exploiting the death of Stalin in the U.S. interest. Although the present paper does not include a statement of long-run U.S. aims in Russia and Eastern Europe, it is believed that a clarification of these aims and their successful projection is a key element in the CANCELLATION problem.

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II. The Setting of the Problem

2. It is now some 23 years since Stalin's personal dictatorship in the Soviet Union was established, and about 13 years since the major posts or power were turned over to his men. Over this period has evolved a remarkable centralization of executive decisions within the Soviet state and a virtually complete centralization of authority over the instruments of power: i.e., the Army, Party, Secret Police, and Bureaucracy. Since the end of the Purges a set of fixed policies, relationships, and procedures developed so powerful that post-war Soviet internal policy has consisted in an almost mechanical return to pre-1941 "normalcy"; while Soviet policies in the satellites have largely consisted of a branch office duplication of pre-1939 methods evolved within the Soviet Union.

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In envisaging Stalin's death we are envisaging the withdrawal of the key figure from a mature, stabilized organization built to guarantee an unchallenged exercise of executive power by one man.

3. The instruments of internal Soviet power, when unified at the top and supported by an almost totally monopolized propaganda and information system, are judged capable of preventing the effective crystallization of popular opposition movements within the Soviet state and of overwhelming such overt opposition as may emerge. It is, thus, our judgment that, while popular dissatisfactions may play a part in the unfolding of an internal crisis, such a crisis is unlikely to be significant unless it involves a splitting apart of the instruments of power at the top. The following appraisal of the setting of the problem is therefore devoted primarily to a consideration of such partial evidence as is now available to us concerning the position within the Politburo, where Stalin has centralized his command over the state, and concerning the Army, where certain independent political attitudes may have evolved. The problem will be treated in a wider setting in the final Vulnerability Report.

III. The Present Politburo

4. The present Politburo, in order of full membership seniority, consists of:

Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Andreev, Mikoyan, Krushchev, Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin, Kosygin. There is one candidate member: Shvernik. *(alternate)*

✓ Five full members may be fairly called "Old" Bolsheviks: Molotov, Voroshilov, Andreev, Mikoyan, Kaganovich. ✓ Five full members may be

S-E-C-R-E-T

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S-E-C-R-E-T

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fairly called "New" Bolsheviks: Khrushchev*, Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin, Kosygin. ✓

* Khrushchev, son of a poor coal miner, his education consisting of a year or two at the Stalin Industrial Academy at the age of 35, could be said to straddle the two groups. He had an unnamed part as a soldier in the 1917 revolution and in the Civil War. As a member of the Central Committee he survived the 1937-1938 purge, becoming an alternate member of the Politburo January 1938 and full member March 1939. But he did not join the Party until after the 1917 Revolution, which disqualifies him as a genuine "old" Bolshevik. His real power has been post purge; and his rise has been mainly within the Party Committee and secretarial machinery in the Malenkov manner. He seems never to have shared the prestige or power of the "old" Bolsheviks and to be at present subordinate to Malenkov in his special field of Party work. Therefore, on the basis of present information, we have called him a "new" Bolshevik.

5. In examining the Politburo's position certain facts concerning its personnel, Stalin excluded, are of interest in two contexts:

(1) The crisis of World War II.

- (a) Five full members drafted the Constitution (1934-1938):
Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Khrushchev.
- (b) Six were full members during World War II: Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Andreev, Mikoyan, Khrushchev.
- (c) Two were candidate members during World War II and are full members now: Beria, Malenkov.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

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- (d) The greatest responsibility for policy and action during World War II was held as follows: (State Defence Committee)

Molotov, Beria, Malenkov	1941-1945
Kaganovich, Mikoyan	1942-1945
Voroshilov	1941-1944
Bulganin	1944-1945

(2) The Post-War Era.

- (a) Four full members have been added since the war: Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin, Kosygin.
- (b) There is evidence of struggle over both policy and power position from early post-war period to Zhdanov's death (1948) between Zhdanov and Malenkov.
- (c) Voznesensky (candidate member 1941, full member 1947) disappeared in 1949.
- (d) Both Andreev and Khrushchev suffered public rebuke (1950) for their suggested farm policies.
- (e) Three emerging figures assume importance as potential new Politburo members: Ponomarenko, Suslov, Shkiryatov.

6. The Politburo, as presently constituted, shows, then, an even division of membership between what might be called "Old" and "New" Bolsheviks. Further, the criteria of executive skill in the state apparatus and technical training appears to carry the greatest weight in the selection of new members. The group, in general, is composed of experienced, able administrators who propose, discuss freely, and execute policy always within a framework of absolute obedience to and personal loyalty to Stalin, as unquestioned supreme arbiter. Within this group, six members emerge from our intelligence as distinct individuals:

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S-E-C-R-E-T

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(1) Molotov stands out as unique in the degree of intimacy, confidence, and respect accorded him by Stalin at the policy level. His is a position not even approached by any other member of the Politburo. (Every pertinent interview supports this view unequivocally.) Molotov, the "Stone Behind", the cold, rigidly conforming total Bolshevik whose most amiable social gestures are usually only half-successful conventionalities, has unquestioned power - but power derived solely from Stalin and their unique relationship, and not, in prevailing opinion, from native brilliance nor from the exercise of administrative authority over a major sector of the power machinery of the Soviet State.

(2) Voroshilov is closest to Stalin on the "old comrade" level. There is disagreement as to his native ability and real power position, but evidence to show his skill and sense of security in making decisions as late as 1945-46. Old soldier, a "primitive" with both the saint and the devil in him, lover of folk music, he occupies a unique position in the minds of the people - the only member of the Politburo a popular hero known to the people and referred to by them by his nickname, "Klim". Voroshilov has deep roots in the army, historically and sentimentally, and a strong sense of old-fashioned nationalism.

(3) Kaganovich, only surviving Jew in a position of power, the "Iron Commissar" who worships Stalin, who looks like a scholar but has had only two years of schooling, stands out as the supremely versatile troubleshooter and large-scale executive of all the builders of Soviet industrial strength. Perhaps even more important, he stands out in the popular eye as a symbol, the creator of widely publicized Soviet accomplishments such as the Moscow subway, and, despite his ruthlessness,

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

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as the object of admiration on the part of the people and labor who have worked under him - in a sense very distinctly a popular hero at least in certain areas.

(4) Mikoyan, a fourth "Old" Bolshevik, only one of the Baku commissars to escape execution after the occupation of Baku by the British in 1918, is an amiable but shrewd, hard-boiled, realistic Armenian who would trade the eyes out of his grandmother's head if it would be to his advantage. He is volatile - a colorful exception to the Bolshevik personality pattern. Mikoyan is the only Politburo member who has visited the United States to study American methods and products and returned to Russia to express openly his admiration for both - a fact of considerable interest; for he is unquestionably top Soviet trade expert; and in a long-held strong power position which appears to be unchallenged.

(5) Malenkov, a "New" Bolshevik, and full member only since 1946, who has been likened in appearance to a eunuch and to an unfrocked priest, and who makes a universal impression of sullen lust for power, seems to be the wonder of the new generation of Bolshevik leaders. Apparent victor over Zhdanov, he is believed to be a special protégé of Stalin among the younger men. He served on the State Defence Committee during its entire existence, has been recently signally honored on his 50th birthday, and seems to be not only the most powerful figure in the Party apparatus but also to have emerged as the most striking personality in the Politburo - excepting Stalin and Molotov.

(6) Beria, also a full member only since 1946, and a member of the State Defence Committee during its entire existence, is a figure of special interest if only because of his position for 13 years as

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

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head of the Secret Police. Deceptively mild and scholarly in manner and appearance, actually a far-sighted and exceptionally skillful intriguer for power, Beria has reputedly an uncanny intuition for identifying and attacking to himself loyal supporters. As the probable Soviet atomic chief, the administrator of the forced labor program, and the person most singly responsible for the enormous and powerful system of police controls, Beria, who emerged publicly as the Anniversary speaker November 1951, is one of the trio of most powerful Soviet leaders - Molotov and Malenkov the other two.

7. Any present estimate of the Politburo must be made in relation to the over-all power framework within which the Politburo members function as individuals: a system of interlocking directorates, of personal checks and balances, shifting public prominence, control by whim or policy of Stalin, all thus far designed to prevent the more-than-momentary emergence of any single member as a possible successor; the whole system aiming to permit control over and equilibrium among the Party, the Police, the Army, and the state bureaucratic apparatus.

8. Certain tentative generalizations are suggested by post-war information concerning the four power components in the Soviet structure:

- (1) The Party as a sacrosanct body has slowly but steadily lost power as a separate entity, tending to become an administrative arm of the state with special propaganda, intelligence, and overseer functions.
- (2) The power of the Police has steadily increased.
- (3) The Party and the Police are united in one special effort: to prevent any real unifying and solidifying of an independent Army

S-E-C-R-E-T

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sentiment.

- (d) The bureaucracy, recovering from the shock-effect of the Purges, emerges more and more distinctly as a class with vested interests and privileges in the present regime, although harassed by the Party and, especially, the Secret Police.

IV. Politburo Incentives at the Death of Stalin

9. The immediate seizure of power by one man or by a *transmute* troika is a possibility to be considered if Stalin's death is preceded by his decline and loss of power over a long enough time to permit the effective development of a conspiracy before his actual death. The position of chairmanship or deputy assumed by any single man with Stalin sick but still alive would not necessarily be one of real power, although a chairman might be able to consolidate it as such.
10. The system of personal power checks is such that it would seem impossible for any effective conspiracy to be worked out except over a period of time - after what might be called a "sorting out" of relationships and real power alignments, a sparring and "feeling-out" period.
11. At the death of Stalin the Politburo will have the most powerful double incentive for immediate close cooperation: the urgent need of unity to sustain the power of internal control, without which they, along with the system, would be destroyed; and the urgent need to present a situation of continuing strength and unity of policy vis-à-vis the West. The uppermost thought in their minds, individually as well as collectively, will undoubtedly be that an overt struggle for the succession might lead to a break-up of the regime which might permit foreign intervention in Russia.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

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12. Most obvious incentives to a split in the Politburo after Stalin's death are two: individual power drives, and irreconcilable differences on policy. It is a reasonable assumption that neither can effectually materialize at present only because of Stalin's absolute power to make the ultimate decisions. A more subtle and yet perhaps deeper and older incentive to Politburo split may lie in certain differences between the "Old" and "New" bolsheviks.

V. Divisive Potentials after Stalin's Death

13. Politburo members even in their freest conversations seem never to refer to other leaders by name; and their expression of personal interests and principles never takes the form of explicit criticism of the policies of the regime. Therefore the attempt on our part to discern divisive potentials in Russian leadership is made largely in the realms of conjecture and inference. The researcher does not reach positive conclusions but does see leads indicating the possible fruitfulness of further and more extensive research supported by specifically aimed intelligence operations.

14. At this stage in the limited leadership project evidence suggests certain potentially divisive factors, in ascending order of importance:

- a) Personal relationships in the Politburo;
- b) Possible differences at the level of national economic policy;
- c) The balance of power between the "Old" and "New" Bolsheviks;
- d) The special position and political orientation of the Red Army;

S-E-C-R-E-T

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A. Personal Relationships in the Politburo.

15. This is at present the most speculative area of our interest owing to the fact that so much of the relevant information is merely rumor. It presents perhaps the most difficult and complex problem to intelligence. Nevertheless, as we increase our knowledge of the temperaments and characters of the Politburo members through reported first-hand insights and observations, a source up to the present time exploited to a very limited degree, definite personalities emerge, to which considerable reality is given by confirmations and agreements over a wide range of experience and background in the sources. In any realignment or adjustment of power, personal compatibilities, rivalries, predilections, theories, convictions, family backgrounds, experience, and so on play a subtle but often powerful part. It must not be overlooked that the presence and supreme power of Stalin constitutes the single most effectively repressive force limiting the interplay of Politburo personalities at the emotional level. The death of Stalin may well release divisive potentials at this level which must not be overlooked in estimating the possible courses of action to be taken in the U.S. interest.

B. Possible Differences at the Level of National Economic Policy.

16. These lie almost wholly in the realm of conjecture, but certain personal factors suggest possible conflict between the major interests and convictions of a group of leaders and the present national (Stalin) policy in international relations with its concomitant overbalanced commitment of the national economy to the production of war goods (as opposed to investment goods for economic development and consumers' goods).

S-E-C-R-E-T

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17. Mikoyan, in charge of both foreign and domestic trade, has repeatedly expressed the belief that a fully developed U.S.S.R. foreign trade (impossible now) is essential to successful internal Russian economic progress. Although he has, of course, ostensibly gone along wholeheartedly with present Soviet policy, present information indicates that his pronouncements of admiration and respect for American methods and products, and his desire especially for friendly U.S.S.R.- U.S. trade relations, although made when they were in harmony with official policy, were also statements of Mikoyan's strong personal convictions. ✓ Mikoyan's special interest is in food and consumer goods. More broadly Mikoyan and certain others may feel that, at this stage of Soviet history, the prime task is to develop the domestic economy, not to engage in a foreign policy that requires heavy and continuing major outlays for military end-products. ✓

18. Kaganovich, although primarily a heavy industry man, and one who will slavishly follow Stalin's line and leadership as long as Stalin lives, is a factory worker and trade union organizer in origin, an old Red Army man, and has always, in a sense, built for the people and been one of them. He has been consistently open and friendly with Americans. He may share the view tentatively attributed to Mikoyan in the last sentence, Para. 17, above.

19. Kosygin, youngest and newest member of the Politburo, graduate of the Textile Institute, Leningrad (?), apparently one of the bright "new" Bolsheviks of growing power, is a former textile worker. As one of the young economic experts he has been close to consumer goods production and is now Minister of Light Industry.

20. Shvernik, who has risen from poverty and factory apprenticeship, is

S-E-C-R-E-T

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without formal education and, although second in seniority in party membership, wields very little power. However, nearly his entire career has kept him in close contact with trade unions; he served in the Red Army; and he has a reputation for accessibility to the common people. Three factors in his personal history which suggest an awareness and interest in the people, and, very possibly, a popular rather than a "Stalin" view of the national economy.

21. Of the emerging figures whose closeness to Politburo membership is still a mystery, Ponomarenko, who now probably heads the Procurement Ministry (farm products), is reported as having been genuinely appreciative of UNRRA efforts in 1946; Suslov, probably very close to Malenkov, is reported as having special interest in the working class and the "connection between the depressed status of workers and war policy"; Shkyriatov is by trade a tailor, a worker in clothing factories.

22. These clues, slight because of present intelligence limitations, are nevertheless of some interest when considered in connection with the death of Stalin. The apparent tendency to promote to high positions men of worker and factory experience may broaden the base of popular "feeling" in the Politburo, for it implies the rise of men whose experience with and hard knowledge of consumer economy make the economic policy of the state a very real issue - not something subordinated emotionally and intellectually as a figment of over-all Party Theory. Moreover, they will know firsthand the direct relationship between unsatisfied popular economic wants and popular dissatisfaction with the regime, and thus may be fully aware of the direct connection between personal economic policies and any bid

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

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for popular support in a power struggle. One can see at least the possibility of a group within top Russian leadership who, because of their worker origins, their personal awareness of the unsatisfied economic wants of the people, their special technical knowledge of the production of consumer goods, and their positions of power in industry, might, in the absence of Stalin, desire a U.S.S.R. - West relationship and its resultant national economy emphasis directly opposed to those derived from, say, the Molotov intransigent anti-West attitude.

C. The Balance of Power Between the "Old" and "New" Bolsheviks.

23. Here we move on to firmer ground, in a sense, for Stalin's skillful and constant shifting of Politburo members in positions of power and prestige have been discernible from the outside for many years, and it appears that he balances not only man against man but "Old" against "New".

24. One might cite the all powerful wartime State Defence Committee, having (excluding Stalin) at its inception as its members two "Old" Bolsheviks, Molotov and Voroshilov, and two "New" members, Beria and Malenkov; then, by the addition of Mikoyan and Kaganovich, four "Old" and two "New", but finally, by the replacement of Voroshilov by Bulganin, a nice balance of three and three. Since the war one might say Stalin has balanced Molotov, Mikoyan, and Kaganovich (foreign affairs, trade, heavy industry) against Beria, Bulganin, and Kosygin (police, army, finance, and light industry) - while dividing party control between Malenkov and Andreev.

25. The Order of Lenin has been awarded since the war to five of the "Old" full members of the Politburo and to three "New" members - to Molotov four times, to Malenkov twice. Anniversary speakers (excluding Stalin) have been nicely balanced since the war; but the last two speeches have been made by "New" men - Malenkov and Beria.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

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26. Public rebukes and consequent loss of prestige have been suffered recently (1950) by Andreev, an "Old" Bolshevik and disciple of Molotov, and by Krushchev, technically a "New" man, both agricultural experts. The only member who appears to have been purged since the war is Voznesenski, distinctly a "New" man.

27. The most significant struggle between the "Old" and the "New" Bolsheviks inside the Politburo that has come to our knowledge in the last ten years was between Zhdanov and Malenkov. It was terminated by Zhdanov's death in 1948. Tentative conclusions are that the rising Malenkov not only seriously threatened Zhdanov's power position but has, since Zhdanov's death, taken his place and removed his adherents and protégés from important positions in the Party and State apparatus. ✓

28. These statistics of the Stalin juggling act, in themselves unimportant perhaps, are interesting and provocative in the context of supplementary information - when one is contemplating the disappearance of the juggler. Three brief observations are made here.

29. There are fundamental differences between the "Old" and "New" Bolsheviks which could conceivably affect personal and group power and policy alignments after Stalin's death. The "Old" Bolsheviks are pre-Revolutionary Party members who have been personally close to each other and to Stalin over the entire period of the growth of Soviet power. They are the real builders of the foundations of that power, the basic policy makers and executors who have manipulated the evolution of Bolshevik theory and practice into triumphant Stalinism. As such they have a conscious security, prestige, and power that set them apart. They are a clan united by historic and conspiratorial ties, their thinking and emotions rooted in the total history of Russian Bolshevism. They are headed by the two men closest to Stalin. The "New" Bolsheviks, especially the four youngest,

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

17.

are not the founders but the products of the Soviet State, not builders but managers - in a sense, inheritors. Essentially post-purge and post-war newcomers to real power, they are not the makers but the creatures of Stalinism. They are united by a common history of fighting and intriguig their way up in the dangerously competitive complex of an established power system, in which insecurity and the fatal consequences of failure are the most compulsive forces. As products of the system they must sense the contemporary pulse and mood of the people more directly and more literally than the "Old" leaders. Their thinking has real roots neither in revolutionary theory nor in historic Bolshevism but in the exigent and very real present - a present dominated by the machinery of totalitarian bureaucracy. They are headed by two of the outstanding possessors of visible power in the present Politburo; i.e., Malenkov and Beria.

30. Proceeding from theory to fact, we see the steady encroachment by the "New" Bolsheviks on the power preserves of the Politburo system. Bulganin, strictly a "political soldier", replaced Voroshilov on the all-powerful State Defence Committee in 1944, was Minister of Armed Forces 1947-1949, headed the USSR Delegation to the Meeting of Defence Ministers of Eastern Europe, Prague, 1950, and is now, although no longer Minister of Armed Forces, unquestionably top military authority in the Politburo. Party power, indicated by membership and authority in the Party Control Commission, the Orgburo, and the Secretariat, and by prominence in policy speeches, has been firmly held since Zhdanov's death by Malenkov and his younger men. Malenkov was reportedly Stalin's political representative in Korea in 1951. Although Molotov is evidently still the Politburo authority in foreign affairs, there is evidence of increasing penetration into

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

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the Soviet diplomatic organization of police power under Beria, and the belief on the part of some well informed sources that there is direct connection between that penetration and the rise of younger men like Malik and Gromyko. Since the war there has apparently been a tremendous increase in the power of the Secret Police - as an instrument of terror to insure popular conformity in the face of a continuing war economy, as the eradicator of all possible western thought brought home by returning soldiers, as the destroyer of whole tribes suspected of lukewarm loyalty, and as the assumed custodian of the Russian atomic effort. Moreover, the interlocking of the whole post-war economic program with the forced labor system, supplied and administered by the Secret Police, suggests a new and significant penetration of the whole state structure by police power. And this power is directed by Beria, one of the "New" men.

31. If Stalin dies while the Politburo is constituted as at present there will remain in key positions of power three "Old" Bolsheviks: Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan; and three "New" Bolsheviks: Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin. Of these six, Molotov, Malenkov, and Beria seem to stand out strikingly head and shoulders above all the other members as wielders of power, as personalities, as enjoying the greatest prestige, and as potential leaders - one "Old" Bolshevik, two "New" of sharply contrasting temperaments and histories. Informed opinion varies as to Molotov's native aptitude for leadership; possibly his strength is derived from his special relationship to Stalin and the fact that he is acknowledged head of a group presumably closely knit by loyalty and a common history. Malenkov and Beria have greater native ability than Molotov, it would seem, but a logical inference is that any control they exercise over personal followings is largely based on insecurity and fear upon the part of their subordinates. Beria, as head of

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

19.

the vastly increased police power, is certainly a symbol of the decline of pure Party power represented by Malenkov, and presumably a check on Malenkov. In some respects Beria seems the most sinister figure of the three. But there is strong evidence that Malenkov is the strongest, most ambitious of all if one can judge by the sheer impact of his personality and by his steady rise to power, in a strictly Stalinist pattern, via the Party apparatus. One can speculate endlessly. The cold facts seem to be that these three men may decide the immediate destiny of the Soviet State after Stalin's death; that each has strong claims to and support for his accession to single supreme leadership; that no one of them can succeed to leadership without the support of one of the others; and that the wholesale emergency cooperation which will probably immediately follow Stalin's death will not change these underlying personal and group factors. There are two expressions of opinion based on direct contact with Molotov, Malenkov, and Beria: "If it is a question of survival of one of the three, the survivor will be Malenkov"; "One thing is certain: the "Old" Bolsheviks will never submit to leadership by the "New".

D. The Special Position and Political Orientation of the Red Army

32. The Soviet State would seem to offer no exception to the axiom that the armed forces are the key to power and survival in any dictatorship. This key rôle for the military at a time of crisis in a dictatorship stems from the fact that there are no accepted rules for the handling of executive power. So long as the dictator is successful - maintaining the unity of the instruments of force - the system is stable. At a time of crisis, however, lacking accepted constitutional rules, raw power rules in a dictatorship; and the Soviet armed forces represent the most considerable concentration of armed power, despite the rise of armed units within the MVD.

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Although the [] leadership project has centered on political leadership, specifically the Politburo, one result of our interviews is information which strongly suggests that, despite certain features of the Soviet system since its beginnings, designed to prevent the crystallization of localized or "deviationist" attitudes in the Soviet armed forces, the Red Army has a special position in the Soviet society and, possibly, a political orientation which could bear directly on the situation in the U.S.S.R. following Stalin's death.

33. There is evidence that the Red Army, theoretically drafted and recruited from all classes, has a large percentage of men of peasant origin and those who have volunteered not out of loyalty to the regime but to get better food and more security than offered by their positions in the civilian economy. The practical requirements of military leadership compel the promotion of officers on merit rather than political conformity probably to a larger degree than in any other part of the Soviet system. Even old Bolshevik army leaders like Voroshilov and Budenny are noticeably deficient in political enthusiasm; and Red Army loyalties seem to have been long rooted in devotion to Russia - not to Communism or Party. Thus the very texture of the Red Army would give it a special position in Soviet society as a potential reservoir of political unreliability. Moreover, its position in the eyes of the people since the war is that of the real savior of the homeland; and we have been told that it is the only one of the four power elements in the Soviet state which does not symbolize repression and which, therefore, the people neither distrust nor fear.

34. Every inference that can be drawn from the established and recent military control policies of the Soviet political leadership confirms the

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

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special position of the Red Army and points to Politburo awareness of its potential significance. The system of political commissars goes back to 1920. Stalin struck wholesale at the Red Army top command in the Tukhachevsky purge in 1937. Since then the Red Army has been "loaded" with political commissars and secret police. Beria was reportedly active in the army during the last war. Malenkov has risen from a beginning as an army political commissar. Bulganin, strictly an executive and political figure, has been made a marshal and put at the head of national defence. Popular Red Army heroes like Zhukov, Rokossovsky, and Malinovsky have been scattered from central and closely related positions, and dropped from all recent public mention in celebrations of war victories. Outside of the U.S.S.R. the Allied Command in Berlin observed first hand the subordination of the Soviet military to political and police control (with a resultant drastic change for the worse in personal and official Russian-American relationships). From inside the U.S.S.R. we are told of a special army with artillery and tanks within the police system, the inference being that there is official doubt of the reliability of the Red Army if called upon in certain situations, say large scale overt popular discontent.

35. But there is good reason to doubt that the Politburo has been wholly successful in its methodical and systematized effort to effect "correct" political orientation in the Red Army. We recall the Vlasov movement. The morale in the ranks of the Red Army in Germany at the end of the war was, in the opinion of qualified observers, very low, with breaches of discipline and desertions far exceeding expectancy based on all western military experience. Insight into the real political orientation of Red Army officers in the Berlin area was afforded by the many friendships between

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U.S. and Soviet personnel. In the considered opinion of many Americans of lieutenant to major rank Red Army officer fraternization was not based merely on friendly curiosity and liking for the better American food and quarters but also on genuine Russian interest in democratic concepts. And in at least two instances cited by sources whose perception and judgment are beyond question Red Army officers of high rank expressed privately a sincere desire to see Germany united under a political system embracing such specific democratic concepts as free schools, free press, and freedom of speech in the western meaning of the terms.

36. Glimpses of Red Army sentiment obtained from recent interviews indicate that the enduring Russian peasant desire for land ownership seems to be strong among Red Army soldiers. General officers express a desire to own property, have servants, and live in typical bourgeois style upon retirement. The Red Army as a whole apparently has old-fashioned nationalist sentiments, fought for Russian soil, and, not being in sympathy with Soviet imperialist expansion, may well be disillusioned by and hostile toward post-war Stalinism. Red Army lieutenant-colonels in 1947, talking in assured privacy, gave a low estimate of the ability of Stalin's aviator son, were scornful of Bulganin's promotion to Marshal, and expressed total disbelief in the official line that Russia was in danger of attack by the U.S.

37. While emphasizing the very limited scope of our research into Red Army personnel and leadership, we feel that the kind of information we have received has direct relevance to any consideration of the situation in Russia following Stalin's death, and that we have sampled an area in which extensive research is advisable and urgent.

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VI. Conclusions

38. On information now available to us, and on the analytic view set forth above, we reach the following tentative conclusions:

(1) The dictatorship created by Stalin is the consequence of a substantial historical process, with important consequences for the present bureaucratic structure of the Soviet state and Soviet society in general. The uniqueness of the position he has created, the vesting in him of absolute power in executive decisions, plus the fact that his power is essentially a de facto rather than de jure creation, make it exceedingly unlikely that the succession can pass simply and easily to any one person. Nor is it likely that any small group can exercise smoothly such arbitrary dictatorial power over any considerable period of time. Stalin's death is, therefore, likely to confront the Politburo with the following alternatives: a formulation of and agreement on a principle of succession and of subsequent collective decision making; or a power struggle between the strongest individuals for single control.

(2) Present Soviet propaganda, especially internal propaganda, reiterating the theme of a historic and increasing contemporary external threat by the West, is an appeal to Russian nationalism designed to unify the four elements in the state structure, (Party, Police, Army, Bureaucracy) and strengthen popular support for the regime under Cold War circumstances, as well as against the day of Stalin's death or of Hot War.

(3) Powerful motives of self-preservation both as individuals and as a group in control of the system which has created their power positions will operate at the time of Stalin's death to solidify the Politburo as a unit.

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(4) Nevertheless, there are four identifiable divisive potentials which might conceivably operate following Stalin's death. They are set down here in an ascending order of importance based on our present information:

- a) Personal relationships in the Politburo.
- b) Possible differences at the level of national economic policy in relation to foreign policy.
- c) The Balance of Power between the "old" and the "new" Bolsheviks.
- d) The special position and political orientation of the Red Army.

(5) Should a break occur at the top of the structure one can imagine the subsequent effects spreading from both top and bottom and ramifying throughout the whole Soviet power structure - Party, Police, Army, Bureau-cracy. Thus any significant divisive movements that might result from Stalin's death are likely to cut across lines and involve the interplay and shifting alignments of more, and at present, less obvious forces than the four we have outlined. Such movements might bring into play the total complex of tensions in Soviet society as one contending group or another reached back into the country for popular support. Furthermore, the lifting of the weight of Stalin's control will probably be less likely to result in a swift total recoil of suppressed forces than in a progressive release to action of many separate and hesitantly meshing forces in the whole social and political mechanism, taking place over time.

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